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# Blockchain and Smart Contracts – From Theory to Practice

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## **Schedule**

#### □ Part I – Blockchain Motivation

- Timeline and Basics
- Consensus Mechanisms
- Management Aspects

#### □ Part II – Smart Contracts

- Smart Contract
- Best Practices
- Security

#### □ Part III – Discussion & Considerations


- Challenges and Risks
- Considerations

## Part I – Blockchain Motivation

#### **Blockchain 1.0**

## Digital Currency

- Decentralized payment system
- Bitcoin as the father of digital currencies
  - Still, not much awareness of (other) Blockchain capabilities
- Proof-of-Work (PoW)




**Public Perception** 

#### **Blockchain 2.0**

#### Smart Contracts

 Ethereum unlocks the blockchain potential beyond cryptocurrencies


Blockchain is able to run computer programs in a transparent



#### **Blockchain 3.0**

## Decentralized Applications (DApps)

- Production stage:
  - Large number of applications
- Scalability/Performance issues:
  - Need for performance → new consensus protocols
  - Need for storage → off-chain storage tools



BTC Bubble

**Public Perception** 

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
the world!»

#### **Blockchain 4.0**

#### Ecosystem and Industry Integration

- Making blockchain effective in industry
- Decentralized and disconnected blockchain new
  - Vendor-specific blockchain technology, interoperab
- Need for standardization

#### As of today





































## **Blockchain Eras and Evolution**

4 different BC eras are running in parallel today



1.0 – December 08/January 09: Bitcoins

Cryptocurrencies: 2095 • Markets: 1583

• More than 2100 cryptocurrencies available today

- **€** CoinMarketCap
- 2.0 2012-14: Ethereum, Smart Contracts, Solidity, ...
- 3.0 April 2012: Decentralized Apps (dApps) "Satoshi Dice" https://hackernoon.com/dapp-and-things-you-need-to-know-4f50853a4cb7
  - Running on peer-to-peer network, all data transparent and tamper-proof
- 4.0 App. 2015: BC ecosystems and industrial integration
  - Countless Blockchain projects in many fields
    - FinTech, supply-chain, governmental, identity, ...

## **Driving Questions**

9

- How and under which conditions to use blockchain?
  - Creator (e.g., researcher) or investor point-of-view
- Is there a right or wrong? A roadmap for blockchain usage, possibly.
  - There is no simple answer ...




Application

"What are application requirements?"

Blockchair

"Which different types of blockchain one can offer?"




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
# **Blockchain (BC) Basics**

#### **Definition**

A Blockchain (BC) or Distributed Ledger (DL) is a decentralized digital ledger that transparently and permanently record blocks of transactions across computers based on a consensus algorithm without modifying the subsequent blocks.




## **Permissions and Transparency**




#### **Block**

- A block is a structure to store data (transactions)
  - Header: information to identify the block.




# Integrity, Merkle Tree

In practice, the Merkle Tree guarantees immutability




Imagine if one wants to remove/change a transaction



#### **Transactions**

- How are transactions stored in a block?
  - Transaction pool or mempool
    - Temporary storage structure (RAM) available on each full node (Ethereum)



## **Blockchain Consensus**


## Mechanisms for Distributed Agreement

- Also called "Distributed Consensus" algorithms
- □ The 4 key characteristics

https://pradeeploganathan.com/blockchain/consensus/

- Uniform agreement: No two nodes decide differently
- Integrity: No node decides twice
- Validity: If a node decides on value v, then v was proposed by some node
- Termination: Every node that does not crash eventually decides on some value
- □ Given a cluster of N nodes and a set of proposals  $P_1$  to  $P_m$ , every non-failing node will eventually decide on a single proposal  $P_x$  without the possibility to revoke that decision. All non-failing nodes will decide on the same  $P_x$ .

## **Overview**




## Classical Consensus Mechanisms (1)

#### Classical Consensus Models

- Crash failure models -> honest nodes failing
- Byzantine Failure Tolerance (BFT)
  - State machine replication

HyperLedger (SOLO, Kafka mechanisms), Stellar


BFT General's Problem




Imagine Rome being besieged by nine armies, each commanded by a (Byzantine) general.




In order to launch a succesful attack or retreat, all armies have to do the same, otherwise they will be decimated by Rome's armies.




The decision to either attack or retreat is put up to a vote. Whichever option receives more than 50% of the votes, that's what the Generals will do (retreat in the example above).



Problem 1
The generals communicate by using couriers, who have to cross unknown areas controlled by the Romans, risking capture or their message becoming corrupt.



Problem 2
Each of the generals could be bribed by the Romans:
Traitorous Generals.





Problem 3
Any of the Generals can make the wrong decision, regardless of the vote:
Improperly Functioning Generals.



# **Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)**

- Described as the capacity of a system to handle or survive unreliable situations and (all kinds of) failures
- Practical BFT (PBFT): assume a small fraction of nodes as Byzantines (dishonest)
  - A client sends a request to invoke a service
  - 2. The primary leader multicasts the requests to the replicas
  - 3. Replicas execute the request and send a reply to the client
  - 4. The client wats for F+1 replies from different replicas with the same result






n = Total # of nodes in network  $f = \frac{n-1}{3} \text{ (Max } \# \text{ of faulty nodes)}$ 

PBFT property

# Classical Consensus Mechanisms (2)

#### Elected Leader Models

- Probabilistic elected leader in a
  - Lottery-like
  - Competition, or
  - Probabilistic algorithm



PoX: Proof-of-X, where *X*=

A: Authority

B: Burn

C: Capacity (storage)

D: Deposit

S: Stake

T: Trust

W: Work

d: delegated

## **Proof-of-Work (PoW)**

- Set of transactions becomes available, a block is created by utilizing the following data:
  - Transaction(s), hash of previous block
  - Nonce (arbitrary number, can only be used once)
  - Other information (depending on BC)
- Hash of new block is calculated
- Checking performed once hash was computed
  - Hash is above the target value → Another miner may have found a suitable hash, block attached to local BC, but miner lost the lottery, otherwise nonce will be incremented, retry
  - Hash is below the target value → This miner won the lottery and the new block's hash determines the PoW result


## Hash-based PoW (1)

- Key: One cannot compute an input from an output
  - To find a hash with N zeros at input start, requires 2\*N computations, which proves computational work performed
  - Hashing an incrementing "nonce" as hash input, leads to zeros

- Distributed game sets the difficulty N of the game
- Players accumulate points by creating blocks
  - Hashing the previous block, finding a hash of the new block with enough zeros, and transmitting this block to everyone

# Proof-of-Stake - PoS (1)


- Blocks are "mined" according to the amount of "tokens" he or she holds:
  - The higher is the number of tokens (coins) at stake, the higher is the "mining power"
  - Nodes gets the block reward as incentive



# Proof-of-Stake - PoS (2)


#### Nothing at stake issue:

 Creating forks is "costless" when someone is not burning an external resource (e.g., mining power), PoS alone is "unworkable"



# **Proof-of-Authority (PoA)**


- PoA is a modified form of PoS where instead of stake a validator's identity performs the role of stake
- Authorities (nodes) are allowed to create news blocks
  - Clique (practical implementation) of PoA
    - Requires N/2+1 (more than 50%) of signers to be honest
    - Authorities sign new blocks in a Round-robin (RR) fashion



## **Hybrid Consensus**

## Hybrid Consensus Models


- Using a single consensus has many limitations
  - Combine different consensus mechanisms




## **Hybrid Sharding**

## Hybrid Sharding

- System can be organized into shards (communities)
- Cross-chain communications





# Comparison of Consensus Mechanisms (hocompolete)

Mecha- nism	Security Level	Depending on	Scalability	Remarks
BFT	"Reasonable" Leader pre-elected 51% failure	-	Medium	Trust in pre-election
dBFT	"Reasonable" Set of leaders pre- elected	-	Medium	Trust in set of leaders
PoW	High 51% attack	Hashes	Controversial	Energy consumption high, needed to ensure high security level (by design)
PoS	Unknown "Nothing-at-Stake"	PoW-based "stake"	Under discussion	"Costless" forking, thus, measurable assets needed
PoA	Identity-based	PoS, PoW	Under discussion	Authorities required
Shards	Unknown	Any PoX	Unknown	Communities, interoperability

# **Blockchain Adoption**

# **Choosing a Blockchain**

Posted November 22, 2015 by Gideon Greenspan in Private blockchains.

#### Avoiding the pointless blockchain project

How to determine if you've found a real blockchain use case

#### Do you need a Blockchain?

#### The Use of Blockchains: Application-Driven Analysis of Applicability


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# **Deployment Models**




# G. Greenspan (2015)

Key Points	When to use BC	Traditional DBs	
Database	Shared	Centralized, Shared	
Multiple writers	Multiple writers	Single or multiple	
Absense of trust	Database with multiple non-trusting writers	Trust	
Disintermediation	No trusted intermediaries	Trusted intermediary	
Transaction interaction	There is a dependency between transactions	Trust the intermediary to mediate interactions	
Set the rules	Clear rules applied to all writers	Different rules based on roles/groups of writers	
*Pick your validators	Trust in the validation scheme (single entity or democratic)		
*Back your assets	Translation of digital assets into the real world		

\*Recommendations

# K. Wüst, A. Gervais (2018)



Based on K. Wüst, A. Gervais

## K. Wüst, A. Gervais (2018) - Cont.

## Performance and scalability requirements impacts of alternative BC solutions and data bases in comparison

	Permissionless Blockchain	Permissioned Blockchain	Central Database
Throughput	Low	High	Very High
Latency	Slow	Medium	Fast
Number of readers	High	High	High
Number of writers	High	Low	High
Number of untrusted writers	High	Low	0
Consensus mechanism	Mainly PoW, some PoS	BFT protocols (e.g. PBFT [6])	None
Centrally managed	No	Yes	Yes

BFT: Byzantine Fault Tolerance

PBFT: Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance

# Application Trade-offs (B. Rodrigues, T. Bocek, B. Stiller, 2018)


- Based on Blockchain characteristics:
  - Performance vs Reliability
    - BC offers slow throughput but more robustness than traditional DBs
  - Confidentiality vs Transparency
    - More transparency (trust) and less confidentiality
  - Distributed vs centralized control
    - No central authority (PoW) or trusted nodes (PBFT)
- Limited storage
- Unknown regulations
  - Different countries, different regulations
- Lack of standards
  - Blockchain 4.0 target

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#### Distributed vs. Centralized Control

- Distributed control based on elected leader (e.g., PoW)
- Partially based on selected leaders (e.g., PoA, PBFT)
- Centralized Control based on trust (e.g., traditional databases)
- Multiple possibilities
  - At the same time...

	Model	Control
Company		Distributed
		Partial
		Centralized



## **Mapping Tradeoffs to Blockchain Types**

	Public Permissionless	Public Permissioned	Private Permissionless	Private Permissioned
Transparency	World visibility	World visibility	Community visibility	Role-based visibility
Control	Distributed due to the election process	Distributed but validators are defined in a selection process	Distributed but validators are defined in a selection process	Centralized based on trusted nodes
Reliability	Full replication (light nodes always rely on full nodes)	Full or partial replication (possible to define super nodes)	Full or partial replication (possible to define super nodes)	Full or partial replication (master-slave)
Performance	<b>Slow</b> due the consensus and replication models	Intermediate depending on consensus and replication models	Intermediate depending on consensus and replication models	Fast because its mostly centrally managed

#### **Part II - Smart Contracts**

#### **Smart Contracts**

- A Smart Contract (SC) may reside inside transactions
  - Executed & validated on every node upon persisting that block
    - E.g., for Bitcoins (blockchain-based cryptocurrency) SCs specify how to withdraw, escrow, refund, or transfer BTC from A to By database! "Active
- □ SCs first mentioned in 1996:


A smart contract is a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract. The general objectives of [a] smart contract['s] design are to satisfy common contractual conditions (such as payment terms, liens, confidentiality, and even enforcement), minimize exceptions both malicious and accidental, and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries. Related economic goals include lowering fraud loss, arbitrations and enforcement costs, and other transaction costs.

Smart contracts alone are not "smart"

N. Szabo

- They need an infrastructure ("technology")
- A blockchain forms the ideal, distributed basis for SCs
- □ The legal relevance of "coded", more general contracts?

## **Ethereum/Solidity**



#### **Smart Contract Best Practices**

- Blockchain is a relatively new and most implementations are experimental
- SC programming requires a different mindset:
  - Changes are not possible once SC is deployed
  - Cost of failures can be high (e.g., DAO)
  - Still.... not immune to vulnerabilities



- Best practices are essential!!
  - Code security, efficiency, readability, ...



https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/general\_philosophy/

## Prepare for failure

Prepare for failure

Rollout carefully

Keep contracts simple

Stay up to date

Be aware of blockchain properties

Fundamental trade-offs

- Pause the contract when things are going wrong ('circuit breaker')
- Manage the amount of money at risk (rate limiting, maximum usage)
- Have an effective upgrade path for bug fixes and improvements

SC Best Practices



## **Rollout Carefully**

Prepare for failure

Rollout carefully

Keep contracts simple

Stay up to date

Be aware of blockchain

Fundamental trade-offs

- Test contracts thoroughly, and add tests whenever new attack vectors are discovered
- Provide bug bounties starting from alpha testnet releases
- Rollout in phases, with increasing usage and testing in each phase

**Practices** properties

Best

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## **Keep Contracts Simple**

Prepare for failure Rollout carefully Keep contracts simple Best **Practices** Stay up to date Be aware of blockchain properties Fundamental trade-offs

- Ensure the contract logic is simple
- Modularize code to keep contracts and functions small
- Use already-written tools or code where possible
- Prefer clarity to performance whenever possible
- Only use the blockchain for the parts of your system that require decentralization

## Stay Up to Date

Prepare for failure Rollout carefully Keep contracts simple Best **Practices** Stay up to date Be aware of blockchain properties Fundamental trade-offs

- Check your contracts for any new bug as soon as it is discovered
- Upgrade to the latest version of any tool or library as soon as possible
- Adopt new security techniques that appear useful

## **Awareness of BC Properties**

Prepare for failure

Rollout carefully

Keep contracts simple

Stay up to date

Be aware of blockchain properties

Fundamental trade-offs

- Be extremely careful about external contract calls, which may execute malicious code and change control flow.
- Understand that your public functions are public, and may be called maliciously and in any order. The private data in smart contracts is also viewable by anyone.
- Keep gas costs and the block gas limit in mind.
- Be aware that timestamps are imprecise on a blockchain, miners can influence the time of execution of a transaction within a margin of several seconds.
- Randomness is non-trivial on blockchain, most approaches to random number generation are gameable on a blockchain.

Best Practices



#### **Fundamental Trade-offs**

Prepare for failure

Rollout carefully

Keep contracts simple

Stay up to date

Be aware of blockchain properties

Fundamental trade-offs -

- Rigid versus UpgradeableMonolithic versus Modular

  - **Duplication versus Reuse**

**SC Best** Practices



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## **Tools for Security Visualization**

#### Surya:

Visual outputs and information about the contracts' structure.
 Also supports querying the function call graph.

#### Solgraph:

 Generates a DOT graph that visualizes function control flow and highlights potential security vulnerabilities.

#### EVM Lab

Rich tool package to interact with the EVM. Includes a VM,
 Etherchain API, and a trace-viewer.

#### ethereum-graph-debugger


 A graphical EVM debugger. Displays the entire program control flow graph.

## **Smart Contract Security Examples**


- Transaction Ordering
  - > Blockchain Shop
- Reentrancy Attacks
  - > Good ATM | Bad ATM

Source: James Chiang


## **Transaction Ordering**




## **Transaction Ordering**



#### **Transaction Order Guard**



#### **Transaction Order Guard**



## **Smart Contract Security**

- Transaction Ordering
  - > Blockchain Shop
- □ Reentrancy Attacks
  - > Good ATM | Bad ATM

#### **ATM Contract**

```
contract ATM {
                                mapping(addr => uint) balances;
      ATM.withdraw(amount)
                              →function withdraw() {
                                  // checks balance
                                  // transfer funds
                                  // updates balances
User
      msg.sender
        .transfer(amount)
```

0x627...

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0xc5f...

```
contract BadATM {
                                                    contract ATM {
                 function attack() {
                                                      mapping(addr => uint) balances;
                    // calls withdraw
                                                      function withdraw() {
                                                         // checks balance
                  function () payable {
                                                         // transfer funds
                    // calls withdraw again
                                                        // updates balances
   User
                    // until reentrancy target
0xc5f...
                          0xf17...
                                                                0x627...
```

```
contract BadATM {
    function attack() {
        // calls withdraw
    }


User

Contract ATM {
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        // checks balance
        // transfer funds
        // transfer funds
        // until reentrancy target
    }
    ...
}


Oxc5f...

Oxf17...

Ox627...
```



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   User
                     // until reentrancy target
                                                                     update balance
                                                                     before transfer
0xc5f...
                           0xf17...
                                                                  0 \times 627...
```



```
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function () payable {
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    // until reentrancy target
  }
  ...
}
```

```
contract ATM {
  enum States {
    Ready,
    Pending
}
function withdraw() {
    // checks if ATM is Ready
    // set ATM to Pending
    // check balances & transfer
}
....
}
```

0xc5f...

0xf17...

0x627...

```
contract BadATM {
                                                    contract ATM {
                                                      enum States
                 function attack() {
                                                        Ready,
                    // calls withdraw
                                                        Pending
                                                      function withdraw() {
                  function () payable {
                                                        // checks if ATM is Ready
                    // calls withdraw again
                                                        // set ATM to Pending
   User
                                                         // check balances & transfer
                    // until reentrancy target
0xc5f...
                          0xf17...
                                                                0x627...
```

```
contract BadATM {
                                                    contract ATM {
                                                      enum States
                 function attack() {
                                                        Ready,
                    // calls withdraw
                                                        Pending
                                                      function withdraw() {
                  function () payable {
                                                         // checks if ATM is Ready
                    // calls withdraw again
                                                         // set ATM to Pending
   User
                                                         // check balances & transfer
                    // until reentrancy target
0xc5f...
                          0xf17...
                                                                0x627...
```

```
contract BadATM {
                                                    contract ATM {
                                                      enum States
                 function attack() {
                                                        Ready,
                    // calls withdraw
                                                        Pending
                                                      function withdraw() {
                  function deposit() {
                                                      X // checks if ATM is Ready
                    // calls withdraw again
                                                         // set ATM to Pending
   User
                                                         // check balances & transfer
                    // until reentrancy target
0xc5f...
                          0xf17...
                                                                0x627...
```

```
contract BadATM {

function attack() {
    // calls withdraw
}

function () payable {
    // checks balance
function () payable {
    // calls with msg.sender.call.value(amount)() s balances
    // until reentrancy tare
}

0xc5f...

0xf17...

0x627...
```

#### The transfer-Function

- ☐ Only a small amount of gas is sent along (21,000 gas).
- ☐ The receiver can only emit one single event at max, safe by "accident".

```
contract BadATM {

function attack() {

    // calls withdraw
}

function () payable {
    // checks balance
function () payable {
    // transfer funds
    // calls withdraw
    // until reentrancy target
}

0xc5f...

0xf17...

0x627...
```

#### In Conclusion - Best Practices

- Prepare for failure
- Rollout carefully
- Keep contracts simple
- Stay up to date
- Be aware of blockchain properties

#### **Others**

- Safe Math (Overflow)
- Error Handling (Revert / Require / Throw)
- Best Practices e.g. <u>Recommendation for Smart Contract</u>
   <u>Security in Solidity</u>

# Part III - Discussion and Considerations

#### **Overview of Blockchain Challenges**

- How to handle reliably tangible (non-digital) assets in BC?
  - A Bitcoin is represented as bits vs. property, real estate as physical items
- Sustainability: Energy efficiency of consensus mechanisms?
  - Energy consumption for Bitcoin BC alone in 2017 ≈ Iceland's production
- Scalability: BC throughput as a number of transactions per second, volume of data persisted in Mega (?) bytes, costs?
  - E.g., BC sizes grow faster than the density of HDDs/SSDs
  - BC (always) better than a (distributed) data base? Exorbitant costs?
- Identity management (users, objects) and anonymity
- Standardized APIs for switching BCs for BC-based dapps
  - E.g., in contrast, databases from different vendors offer "similar" APIs
- Many economic effects of BC-based cryptocurrencies unknown
  - Role of national "e"-currency, interrelationships of about 2000+ cryptoc.
- Legal/regulative compliance, societal/governmental acceptance

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# **Mapping Challenges (1)**

	Public Permissionless	Public Permissioned	Private Permissionless	Private Permissioned
Scalability	Public usage → <b>size</b> <b>growth hard to be</b> <b>controlled</b>	Only selected nodes create blocks → more control over size	Blockchain designed for specific use case → controlled size	Blockchain designed for specific use case → controlled size
Data Storage	Not designed as DB → High fees, size is limited	Know writers → <b>No fees, no size limit</b>	Know participants → Low fees, partial size limit	Know writers → <b>No fees, no size limit</b>
Sustainability	PoW → computational power has no "social benefit"	PoA → Sustainable, no significant computations	PoS → Sustainable, no significant computations	PoA → Sustainable, no significant computations
Identity Management	Pseudo-anonymity, data visible → <b>Hard to</b> <b>link to physical user,</b> <b>data encryption</b>	Data is supposed to be visible → Ensuring integrity	Know participants → <b>Trusted environment</b>	Know participants → <b>Trusted environment</b>

## **Mapping Challenges (2)**

	Public Permissionless	Public Permissioned	Private Permissionless	Private Permissioned
Standardization	No standard → Complex Interoperability	No standard → Complex Interoperability	No standard → Complex Interoperability	No standard → <b>Complex Interoperability</b>
Trust	Data in the BC → <b>Trusted</b> Input data → <b>Untrusted</b>	Know writers → <b>Trusted</b>	Know participants → Trusted Environment	Know participants → <b>Trusted Environment</b>
Economics and Regulations	No clear regulations → <b>Gray area</b>	No clear regulations → <b>Gray area</b>	Regulated by participants → <b>Defined</b> rules	Regulated by participants → <b>Defined</b> rules

#### **Public Blockchain Risks**

- BCs' "true semantics" depends on the input received!
- BCs' security, privacy, and reliability
  - Unknown attack vectors (& 51% attack), Programming errors in SCs
  - Alternative consensus mechanisms beyond PoW? Security at stake?
  - The breaking of currently used security algorithms
    - Long-term storage? Quantum Computing impacts?
  - Privacy: persisted data at stake? GDPR?
    - The right to forget vs. immutability
    - Transparency (public knowledge of BC) vs. privacy (private data)
- Networking infrastructure's reliability (critical infrastructures)
  - Lacking Internet connectivity for a "longer" period of time?
- Economic/legal risks (cryptocurrency/tokens/coins, BC)
  - Fraudulent profitability projections, volatility, dispute resolutions

#### **Conclusions**

- 1. Blockchains **do** show a logical evolution of linked lists, however, they "exaggerate" processing demands
  - Especially Proof-of-Work (PoW), but this ensures immutability
- The technical future of blockchains is based on security ingredients of today's technology, however, long-term storage and security management is not known by now
  - E.g., unknown impact of Quantum computing (on all IT!)
- 3. Blockchains are **no** revolution, but a typical Computer Science (Abstract Data Type) evolution of linked lists
  - The "distribution" of consensus does not always make sense
  - Any system as of the past has *not* been replaced fully by a
     BC

## Thank you for your attention.



**Questions?**